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1. Several changes in agricultural policies in Mexico have taken place during the administration 
of President Fox, which started in December 2000. For the first time in modern history an 
opposition party won the Presidential election in July of that year. The new government has 
shown a new attitude towards agriculture, seeking to the greatest possible extent market 
oriented policies and is pushing hard to change the attitude of Mexican farmers, in order to 
foster their entrepreneurial skills. Traditionally most farmers have relied heavily in government 
guidance for their production and marketing decisions. In contrast, the largest farmer 
organizations, with strong political ties to the former governing Party, do not share at large the 
new policy orientations. Moreover, the Fox administration does not hold a majority in Congress. 
Even though all political parties state that agriculture is one of their main priorities, a common 
view is lacking. Policy developments during the last two years should be analyzed under the 
perspective of compromise between the major players involved. 
 
II. Planning of Agricultural and Rural Development Policies in Mexico  
 
2. As mandated by the “Law of Planning”, a new government must publish its “National 
Development Plan” during its first year in office, as well as specific Plans for all main areas of 
public policy. It is also mandatory to consult society in the planning process. The “ Program for 
Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Nutrition 2001-2006” contains the main 
policy guidelines of the administration.  
 
3. The foreword to this document, written by the Secretary of Agriculture, states clearly that the 
“main critical issues in the rural sector are the lack of most farmers of an entrepreneurial vision 
and the need to foster organizations oriented to satisfy the needs of the domestic market and to 
profit from comparative advantages in foreign markets”. It also emphasizes that due to inefficient 
arrangements along the value added chain, the share of the primary producer in the price paid 
by the final consumer is definitely low. There is no doubt with respect to the new policy approach 
of the new administration: “Subsidies to production and marketing should be radically 
transformed in order to become an additional element to foster rural capitalization and 
investment”  
 
4. Early in the administration, a strong debate took place in Congress related to the approval of 
the “Law for Sustainable Rural Development”. All Parties agreed on the need of legislating for 
the first time in this area, in order to seek consistency between multiple policy goals, multiple 
policy instruments and multiple government executive branches and to guarantee consistent 
policies over time. It was also considered that the role of state and local governments, and 
producer and farmer organizations, in the federal policy making process should be active and 
clearly defined. 
 
5. The President vetoed the first version of the Law produced by Congress , since it mandated a 
great degree of government intervention in agricultural markets. It was possible to follow a fruitful 
dialogue between Congress and the Executive and finally, the Law was published in December 
7
th, 2001.   2
6.  The Law assigns several roles for agriculture: a) To improve welfare in rural areas, 
considering producers, rural workers and other actors of the rural society; b) To reduce regional 
disparities in economic development; c) To foster agricultural production in order to improve 
“food security” conditions; d) To preserve the base of natural resources and biodiversity by 
means of its sustainable use; and e) To recognize the economic, environmental, social and 
cultural dimensions of agriculture. (Art 5). 
 
7. To achieve these goals, the Law calls for coordinated action in public policy in many areas, 
including education and training focused at both agricultural and non a gricultural income 
generation and employment , access to social security, health and family planning, housing for 
rural inhabitants, poverty alleviation, environmental services, and certainty in land tenure, among 
others (Art. 15). 
 
8.  Since actions in those areas fall under the responsibilities of many Ministries, the Law 
provides to the Secretary of Agriculture greater executive faculties to coordinate policies and 
programs related with rural development. A Commission was created for this purpose, in which 
all Ministries and other public entities are present. Another Commission, including government 
officials and producer organizations, acts as an Advisory Board. The interaction between 
federal, state, and municipal governments, and producer organizations, must lead to a concrete 
action plan, the so called “National Concurrent Plan for Rural Sustainable Development” (PEC)
1. 
Each year, the Executive must present to Congress previously agreed programs and actions. 
Final budgetary decisions for each year are an exclusive prerogative of Congress. Multi-year 
budgets for some projects are considered in the Law as a desirable goal, although current 
budgetary legislation precludes any government entity from making any commitment that 
involves resources from any future fiscal year.  
 
9. The “Law for Sustainable Rural Development” sets the stage for better public policies, both in 
terms of design and effective implementation. Nevertheless, it seems that some time will pass 
before public and private actors manage to take full advantage of this legislation, as a result of 
the lack of collective decision making experience in Mexico.  
 
10. Two factors triggered the need for a more detailed Action Plan for Agriculture and Rural 
Development in the second half of 2002. First, the approval in the U.S. of the “Agricultural 
Security and Rural Investment Act 2002”. Public perception worldwide  –including Mexico  - 
considered this Act as a step backwards in the multilateral efforts to level the field in trade in 
agricultural products. Second, the completion in January 1st 2003 of the transition period of ten 
years considered in NAFTA for most agricultural products (with the exception of maize, edible 
dry beans, milk powder and sugar) called for a balance of costs and benefits for Mexican 
farmers of this Agreement and also of the effectiveness of current policy programs aimed at 
smoothing the adjustment process. The Government announced a comprehensive policy 
package in November 2002, usually referred to as “Blindaje Agroalimentario” but officially 
labeled as “Agricultural and Fisheries Policy Actions for Sectorial Strengthening”
2 
 
11.  It considers several measures related to trade and agricultural policies, including both 
administrative and legislative action. In trade policy, this document refers to the need of a more 
effective framework to face unfair competition from imports, and proposed changes to the 
“Foreign Trade Law” in order to reduce the maximum time frame in which preliminary and final 
resolutions in CVD cases must be solved. Reforms to this Law are expected to be enacted soon. 
                                                 
1  PEC: Programa Especial Concurrente 
2 Acciones de Política Agroalimentaria para el Fortalecimiento Sectorial.   3
Moreover, it also calls for changes in the “Law on Grades and Standards”. Under current Law no 
mandatory quality standards for agricultural products are allowed, and provisions on labeling 
requirements lack enforceability to a large extent. The document considers that a greater 
harmonization in grades, standards and labeling regulations in North America is needed to 
consolidate one single integrated market.  
 
12.  In agricultural policy, the document also seeks a greater degree of harmonization in the 
NAFTA area. It proposes an income safety net for main grains and oilseeds on a multi-year 
period, along similar lines as enacted in the U.S. Farm Bill. It also puts a great emphasis in the 
equalization of the terms of access to main inputs in the NAFTA area, specifically energy costs 
(diesel and electricity) and to the greatest possible extent in interest rates and access to credit.  
 
13. All measures established in the “Blindaje Agroalimentario” were intended to be put into place 
in 2003. Nevertheless, the severe political pressure from most producer organizations which 
arose in January 1
st 2003, seeking among other things to renegotiate the NAFTA, led the 
Government to establish a so called “Dialogue to Reach a National Agreement for the 
Countryside”, a process that has not concluded to date. The debate refers not only to trade but 
also to agricultural and rural development policies.  
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14.  The budget of SAGARPA declined sharply in the period 1995-1999, due to the difficult 
macroeconomic conditions that prevailed. During President Fox administration SAGARPA 
budget has steadily recovered in real terms (a cumulative increase of 51 per cent from 1999 to 
2003). Congress has played a key role in increasing the budget for agriculture, at even higher 
levels than those proposed by the Administration. For the first time in ten years, the SAGARPA 
budget will reach a similar level than in 1994, as a percentage of Agricultural GDP.   4
 
15. The main programs of SAGARPA are PROCAMPO (with a share of 34.5 per cent in total 
budget); and Marketing Support with 15.6 per cent. Both programs, operated by ASERCA, 
account for 50.1 per cent of total budget. One of their main stated objectives is to compensate 
producers for subsidies granted in foreign countries. “Alianza para el Campo” grants subsidies 
for in-farm investment and for technology transfer and extension services, and accounts for 15.2 
per cent of the budget. In 2003 the budget for sanitary campaigns and inspection more than 
doubled with respect to the previous year. 
 
PROGRAM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Alianza para el Campo 0 2,524 2,738 2,870 3,213 3,121 4,470 6,893 6,250
PROCAMPO 16,527 14,261 13,133 12,736 12,057 12,194 12,155 12,979 14,191
Marketing Support 2,082 1,096 3,564 2,895 2,024 3,583 5,920 5,867 6,406
Temporary
Employment 0 0 522 604 834 1,037 1,116 1,154 1,800
Sanitary Programs 1,389 229 288 287 300 285 392 361
Other Programs 16,483 15,998 13,696 12,666 8,667 8,817 11,740 9,928 11,591
TOTAL 36,480 34,108 33,941 32,058 27,095 29,036 35,794 37,181 41,109
TABLE 2: BUDGET OF SAGARPA IN REAL TERMS, 1995-2003
(Millons of pesos, base 2003)
Source: Cuenta de la Hacienda PúblicaFederal (Data from 1995 to 2001) and Presupuesto de  Egresosde la Federaci ón (Data 2002 and 2003).
Deflacted with the Index of National Consumer Prices,  Banxico, Year Base = 2003.
871
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16. The total budget for rural sustainable development, as considered in the PEC, amounts to 
117,623 million pesos in 2003. SAGARPA
3 operates only 34.9 per cent of all resources, followed 
by SEP
4 (14.9 per cent) SEDESOL
5 (13.2 per cent), SHCP
6 (8.8 per cent) and SEMARNAT
7 (7.6 
per cent). Critics question not only the amount of these budget, taking into account the great 
shortcomings of Mexican agriculture and rural areas in general, but also the degree in which 
programs are really correlated with the problems that the Rural Development Law is willing to 
overcome. The challenge to coordinate the efforts of so many public entities to achieve 
consistent policy is enormous.  
 
                                                 
3 Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Nutrition. 
4 Ministry of Education. 
5 Ministry for Social Development. 
6 Ministry of Finance. 
7 Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources.   5
TABLE 3: BUDGET FOR RURAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2003*/ 
(million pesos) 
By Ministry or Public Entity 
 
Ministry or Public Entity  Budget  Share (%) 
Ministry of Economy  575.90  0.49 
IMSS **/  207.50  0.18 
Federal Transfers to Municipalities ***/  10,945.80  9.31 
SAGARPA  41,109.30  34.95 
Ministry of Health  6,829.40  5.81 
Ministry of Communications and Transport  1,092.30  0.93 
Ministry of Social Development  15,573.90  13.24 
Ministry of Natural Resources  8,976.60  7.63 
Ministry of Education  17,554.40  14.92 
Ministry of Finance  10,310.30  8.77 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform  3,565.50  3.03 
Ministry of Labor  865.90  0.74 
Ministry of Tourism  16.40  0.01 
TOTAL  117,623.20  100.00 
*/ Preliminary data. 
**/ Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social. 









17. PROCAMPO is one of the main programs for grains and oilseeds (covering maize, beans, 
wheat, sorghum, barley, rice, soybeans, rapeseed, safflower and cotton). It is paid to farmers on 
a per hectare basis. Several changes have been introduced. First, farmers with an eligible area 
of less than one hectare now receive the corresponding payment to one whole hectare. Second, 
the requirement to devote eligible land to productive uses was abolished for farmers with 
production units of less than five hectares. It should be remembered that all producers have the 
chance to keep their lands idle for conservation uses. Third, in 2001 the payment system to 
producers changed gradually. Instead of a bank check, payments started to be done through 
debit credit cards, enabling farmers to collect their money at automatic cashiers, reducing 
thereby transaction costs and simplifying administrative procedures. Fourth, to improve the 
equality characteristics of the program, it was announced that starting in the Autumn Winter 
Season 2003, PROCAMPO payments will be higher for those producers with less than five 
hectares in non irrigated areas. For those producers, the PROCAMPO payment in 2003 will be 
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18.  Most significant of all, Congress approved the “Law for PROCAMPO Capitalization” in 
December 31, 2001.This Law allows that the payments corresponding to one or more crop 
season might be front-loaded at once to producers, under the requirement that resources must 
devoted to a “productive project” that must be directly related with primary production,  food 
processing, access to inputs, and acquisition of capital goods. For fiscal year 2003, there are 
500 millions available for capitalization of productive units under this Law.  
 
TABLE 4: PROCAMPO PAYMENTS PER HECTARE, IN REAL TERMS 
(Pesos, Base year = 2003) 
 
2003   Cropping 




OI */  1,256  1,127  923  842  834  805  832  859  866  1,030  905 
PV **/  1,332  1,240  1,015  967  939  911  914  916  912  1,030   
Source: ASERCA 
*/ Autumm – Winter. 
*/ Spring – Summer. 
 
b) Marketing Support and Other Direct Payments 
 
19. The “Marketing Support Program and Regional Market Development” grants payments to 
producers of some crops in surplus areas. Until 2000, the government and producer 
organizations negotiated a certain price. Then, in a public bid , interested buyers of such crops 
asked for a certain subsidy in order to commit themselves to buy certain amount of that crop at 
the negotiated price. This scheme was increasingly criticized, essentially because few buyers of 
large amounts usually asked for levels of subsidies that were too high, with respect to prevailing 
marketing costs, and also because it was difficult to guarantee that the negotiated price were 
effectively paid to the producer. Additionally, the scheme precluded producers from participating 
in the marketing business (storage and transportation). 
 
20.  Therefore the new administration made drastic changes to the system, starting in the 
Autumn/Winter season 2000/01. Now, all producers benefiting from the program receive directly 
from the government their corresponding subsidies. In the case of most crops, the government 
establishes a fixed amount of subsidy on a per ton basis, considering expected prices during the 
marketing season. Buyers pay to producers prevailing market prices. The new system provides 
producers the right incentives for efficient marketing practices. 
 
21. In the case of wheat and maize in the Northwest, and also maize from Chiapas, the program 
has worked slightly different, because producers feel uncomfortable selling their crops at 
prevailing market conditions, which is a factor of uncertainty.  So, main buyers and producer 
organizations negotiate a certain level of prices at which transactions are to be done, taking into 
account the fixed amount of subsidy per ton that the government is committed to grant to 
individual producers. Negotiated prices take into account, and reflect in some way prevailing 
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TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF THE BUDGET FOR MARKETING ASSISTANCE */, 2002 
(Pesos and percentage) 
 




Direct Marketing Support  3,269,903,466.44  85.7
Complementary Programs  546,024,093.40  14.3
  Maritime Transport  121,658,027.65  3.2
  Export Programs  101,628,825.21  2.7
  Livestock Purchase   127,996,573.08  3.4
  Stock Financing  92,449,417.46  2.4
  Contract Agriculture **/  87,741,250.00  2.3
  Remote Areas***/  10,200,000.00  0.3
  Freight  4,350,000.00  0.1
Total  3,815,927,559.84  100.00
Source: ASERCA. 
*/ Programa de Apoyos a la Comercialización y Desarrollo de Mercados. 
**/ In regions with surpluses, the producer can establish a contract with buyers in the same region to promote diversification of the production. 
***/ The support to transport production from remote areas without infrastructure.  
Note: Preliminary data, February 2003. Excludes mainly subsidies for price hedges and the marketing program for beans. Therefore this figure does not 
match with data included in Table 2. 
 
22.  Therefore, to enhance the marketing process, the government has made use of 
complementary programs: a) Export subsidies; b) Subsidies to pay storaging and financial costs; 
c) Subsidies to pay transportation costs to main consumption areas and d) Subsidies to 
producers in order to sell below the negotiated price grain to the livestock sector of crops, 
among others. Complementary programs account for 14.3 per cent of the total budget  for 
Marketing Assistance. If the structure of production were more diversified, the budget for 
complementary programs could be sharply reduced, to the extent in which enlarger absorption 
of regional supply might be achieve.  
 
23.  Despite the changes made to the Marketing Support Program, it has proved extremely 
difficult to tackle adequately with some of the economic distortions that it generates. The 
structure of production has not only failed to diversify, but it has concentrated even further in 
maize and wheat, specially in the Northwest and Chiapas, where the largest commercial 
surpluses are produced
8. The net result of having in place simultaneously both a non distorting 
program (PROCAMPO) and a distorting program (Marketing Support) is a production distorting 
policy mix.  
 
                                                 
8 For 2001, the Government tried to overcome this problem by negotiating with State Governments specific support levels for a wider 
variety of crops. This approached failed, among other reasons, because it lead to differential support levels for the same crop in 
different states, and therefore to claims of producers of unfair domestic competition conditions inside the country. For 2002 the 
Government returned to a centralized approach for determining support levels.   8
 
TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF THE  MARKETING ASSISTANCE BUDGET BY STATE, 2002 




(Pesos)  Distribution 
(%) 
Sinaloa  1,480,460,756  38.8 
Sonora  939,016,221  24.6 
Tamaulipas  302,334,550  7.9 
Baja California  238,408,247  6.2 
Chihuahua  204,851,086  5.4 
Chiapas  141,440,000  3.7 
Guanajuato  84,731,389  2.2 
Jalisco  76,821,693  2.0 
Michoacán  69,137,850  1.8 
Otros  278,725,768  7.3 
Total Nacional  3,815,927,560  100.0 
Source: ASERCA. 
Note: Preliminary data, February 2003. Excludes mainly subsidies for price hedges and the marketing program for beans. Therefore this figure does not 
match with data included in Table 2. 
 
 
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF THE  MARKETING ASSISTANCE BUDGET BY CROP, 2002 
(pesos and percentage) 
 




Rice (Palay)  92,000,949.75  2.4
Safflower  44,400,464.00  1.2
Barley (Forage)  4,320,746.66  0.1
Maize  1,772,453,194.41  46.4
Sorghum  299,259,104.25  7.8
Wheat  1,396,853,100.77  36.6
Cotton  206,640,000.00  5.4
Total  3,815,927,559.84  100.0
Source: ASERCA. 
Note: Preliminary data, February 2003. Excludes mainly subsidies for price hedges and the marketing program for beans. Therefore this figure does not 




24. Although in the last years seven crops at least were considered in the marketing assistance 
program, there was not an a priori assurance to producers before the planting season regarding 
the product coverage of the program and the level of support for each crop. Therefore the less 
risky decision for producers was planting maize, wheat and sorghum since only those products 
were consistently supported over the last decade. Prices paid to the producers for supported 
crops (including subsidies) for maize, wheat and sorghum in the 2000-2002 period were higher 
than those prevailing in international markets, and even higher than target incomes for U.S. 
producers. Nevertheless, these comparisons reflect  ex post support levels. Iit is also worth 
recalling that the Marketing Assistance Program benefits only  a relatively small number of 
producers (those with commercial surpluses, which account for an estimated 10 per cent of all 
producers).  Finally, prices paid to producers have declined steadily over the last years, as 





SAFETY INCOME IN USA AND MEXICO BY TON FOR SELECTED CROPS 
AUTUMM – WINTER AGRICULTURAL SEASON 2001/2002
(WITHOUT CONSIDER STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES)
Loan Rate Direct Support Counter Cyclical Payment

















































1/ White Maize  in Sinaloa, Yield  OI 2000/2001 =  8.636 ton/ha. Agreed Price for OI 2001/2002.
2/ Wheat Yield  in Sonora  OI 2000/2001 = 5.950 ton/ha. Agreed Price for OI 2001/2002.
3/ Sorghum Yield in Tamaulipas OI 2000/2002 = 2.233 ton/ha. The prices forsorghum is theestimate producer price for OI 2001/2002.
4/ Rice in Veracruz, the producer price is the average of non irrigated and irrigated areas registed by SAGARPA Delegations in OI 2000/2001, theaverage yield = 4.572 ton/ha.
5/ Soybean in Sinaloa, the producerpriceis theaverage registerby SAGARPA Delegationsin OI 2000/2001, theaverage yield = 2.003 ton/ha.
Soruce: ASERCA, USDA y SIAP.
CHART 8:
SAFETY INCOME IN USA AND MEXICO BY TON FOR SELECTED CROPS 
AUTUMM – WINTER AGRICULTURAL SEASON 2001/2002
(WITHOUT CONSIDER STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES)
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TABLE 9: PRODUCER PRICE AND TARGET INCOME FOR MAIZE, WHEAT AND SORGHUM */, 1995-2002 
(pesos / ton) 
 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 **/  2001 **/  2002 **/ 
Product/year  Producer price 
Current prices  815  1,300  1,290  1,315  1,350  1,536  1,550  1,548  Maize 
Sinaloa 
1/  Real prices 1995 = 100  815  967  796  700  616  640  607  574 
Current prices  850  1,789  1,284  1,400  1,380  1,438  1,660  1,660  Wheat 
Sonora  Real prices 1995 = 100  850  1,331  792  745  630  599  651  616 
Current prices  712  1,350  875  960  960  1,050  1,080  1,100  Sorghum 
Tamaulipas  Real prices 1995 = 100  712  1,005  540  511  438  438  423  408 
*/ For maize: Autumm/Winter season price for white maize in Sinaloa; for wheat: Autumm/Winter season price in Sonora; and for sorghum: 
Autumm/Winter season price in Tamaulipas. 
Source: II Informe de Gobierno. Vicente Fox y ASERCA 
**/ These prices consider prices at farm gate plus marketing assistance. Does not include PROCAMPO 
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25.  In the “Blindaje Agroalimentario” the government stated that the support program for the 
grain and oilseed sector should be transformed, mainly by means of reshaping the PROCAMPO 
and Marketing Support Programs. The intention was to switch from a concept of target price per 
ton to a concept of target income per ton. Target Incomes would be composed as the sum of the 
equivalent PROCAMPO payment stated in tons, market incomes and a complementary subsidy 
to reach the desired level of income. It would cover a wide range of crops, and would be fixed for 
five years to allow producers to take decisions on a multi-year scenario, trying to overcome in 
this way the problems associated with the lack of predictability described above, facilitating the 
diversification of production
9. The Target Incomes would operate in all areas of the country with 
surplus commercial production (while the current Marketing Support Program operates only in 
some regions). 
 
26.  Moreover, the document called for individual contracts between the Government and 
producers to grant subsidies, in line with t he objectives of the “Law for Rural Sustainable 
Development”. Individual contracts would grant more flexibility in agricultural policy design, 
gaining consistency between all policy instruments and opening the way to establish incentives 
for individual producers to take decisions in accordance with specific policy objectives, such as a 
sustainable use of resources, good agricultural practices, contracting of crops between primary 
producers and consumers, and crop conversion, among others. 
 
27. To date it is not yet defined the way in which the Target Incomes will operate due to the 
discussions that are taking in place between producer organizations and the Government in the 
“Dialogue to Reach a National Agreement for the Countryside”. 
 
 
V. Changes in the Livestock Sector 
 
28.  Support policies for the livestock sector have not operated in Mexico, other than border 
protection and the programs included in “Alianza para el Campo”. Trade liberalization under 
NAFTA made it necessary to put into place some temporary programs (import tariffs for poultry 
dropped from 49.4 per cent in 2002 to zero in 2003, and tariffs for pork meat dropped from 20 
per cent to zero in the same period). In 2002, a payment of $110 pesos was granted for each 
bovine animal slaughtered in federal approved facilities
10 (TIF, which set high standards 
regarding sanitation), and of $100 pesos for porks. In 2003 these payments will continue, but at 
lower rates. The medium term objective is that consumers gain confidence in the “TIF Label” and 
thereafter would be able to differentiate high value-added products form others, paying 
accordingly in the marketplace. Additionally, it was announced that the livestock sector will 
benefit from a rebate in the purchasing cost of feed grains, in order to allow them to face similar 
costs than its foreign competitors. The details are yet to be defined. 
 
                                                 
9 Products covered by the “Target Income” Program are: maize, wheat, sorghum, safflower, canola, cotton, rice, soybean and 
triticale. 
10 Rastros Tipo Inspección Federal (TIF).   11
 
VI. Competitive Access to Inputs and Services 
 
29.  For 2003, the agricultural policy package considers reducing energy costs for Mexican 
producers to levels similar to those prevailing in the NAFTA Area. Electricity costs for irrigation 
dropped according to consumption level at the lower to 0.3 pesos/kw for consumption levels of 
less than 5,000 kw/hour. At the higher end, it dropped to $0.398 pesos for consumption levels of 
more than 35,000 kw/hour. A pricing rule for the period 2004-2006 will be announced. 
Production of diesel in Mexico is taxed by a special duty that applies only to very few goods and 
services (Impuesto Especial a la Producción y Servicios -IEPS). This tax explains at large the 
difference between the prices of diesel in Mexico and in the NAFTA countries. It was announced 




VII. Reforms to Rural Finance Institutions 
 
30. It is widely recognized that credit, and not subsidies, should be the main instrument to 
achieve rural capitalization. Since the early nineties lending to agriculture has fallen steadily, 
both from commercial banks and public development banks (FIRA and Banrural). In the period 
1990 - 2001, total credit to agriculture fell 72.6 per cent in real terms. Agricultural credit during 
the period decreased more than credit in the overall economy. 
 
CHART 10: CREDIT TO AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND 
FORESTRY 
(Million pesos, Base=1993) 
  CHART 11: TOTAL CREDIT AND CREDIT TO 
AGRICULTURE 
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Total Credit Agricultural
Credit  
Source: Banco de México.    Source: Banco de México and FIRA. 
 
31. In December 26, 2002, it was published a Decree creating a new rural lending institution, the 
“Financiera Rural”, and liquidating the former development bank for agriculture, Banrural, by 
June 30, 2003. Banrural showed severe problems in credit recovery and operational efficiency in 
general. Most credits were granted in very low amounts, with a high administrative cost per unit 
of credit. 89 per cent of all credits were so small that BANRURAL could not cover their 
respective administrative cost. 
   12
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































85% Total Credits < $140,400.00
 
Source: Subsecretaría de Fomento a los Agronegocios, SAGARPA. 
 
32. The “Financiera Rural” is organized under a model similar to FIRA. In the short term it will 
continue to grant credit to producers, but the a im is to grant credit increasingly to smaller 
financial intermediaries in the rural sector, such as credit unions or “cajas de ahorro”. The 
“Financiera Rural” has as its main objectives to provide credit, credit guarantees and factoring 
services directly to producers and to all types of rural financial intermediaries. Its mission also 
contemplates providing assistance and technical support for producers and to new rural financial 
intermediaries. The capital of the “Financiera Rural” will amount initially to 17,515 million pesos, 
which will be complemented with an additional 6,571 million pesos from assets currently 
belonging to Banrural. 
 
33. The biggest challenge is to effectively promote a larger number of rural financial 
intermediaries, which are lacking in many areas of the country, specially in the least developed. 
Moreover, some of these intermediaries have shown in the past a poor financial performance. 




34. The public agency “AGROASEMEX” played several roles in agricultural insurance: a) 
providing direct insurance to producers, in competition with private companies and “insurance 
funds”
11; b) acting as an administrator of federal subsidies aimed at lowering the cost of 
insurance and c) providing reinsurance services. Since 2001, AGROASEMEX retired from first 
floor operations in the insurance market. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Fondos de Aseguramiento. 